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Comments and Casenotes
Motor Vehicle Area Provides Impetus For Further
Expansion Of In Personam Jurisdiction
Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Company'
The insured, a resident of Texas, purchased and regis-
tered an automobile in her name for the use of her minor
son while stationed as a marine in North Carolina. The de-
fendant automobile insurer had extended coverage not only
to the named insured, but to anyone driving with the lat-
ter's permission. The insured owner expressly gave her
son permission to let a third party drive the vehicle. Negli-
gent driving of the insured vehicle by a marine friend of
the owner's son caused the death of a North Carolina resi-
dent on a highway of that state. By substituted service of
process pursuant to North Carolina's Non-resident Motor
Vehicle Statute,2 jurisdiction was obtained over the insured
owner, although she was never present in the state, and a
default judgment was entered against her. A judgment
against the sub-permittee driver being uncollectible, the
plaintiff brought suit in the United States District Court
against the insurance company to recover under the defaultjudgment against the insured owner. An adverse judgment
having been entered against the defendant insurer, the de-
fendant's appeal collaterally attacked the judgment on the
basis of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the insured.3
The Circuit Court of Appeals, Sobeloff, Chief Judge, held,
affirming the District Court's ruling, that since substituted
service of process upon an absent nonresident automobile
owner was authorized by the North Carolina statute, that
Court obtained jurisdiction over the owner and afforded
her due process of law.
On the issue of authorization of service of process under
the North Carolina statute upon a nonresident owner of a
1294 F. 2d 641 (4th Cir. 1961).
lA GEN. STATE of N.C. (Supp. 1959) Ch. 1, § 1-105 [authorization of
substituted service of process] "in any action or proceeding against him,
growing out of any accident or collision in which said nonresident may
be involved by reason of the operation by him, or under his control or
direction, express or implied, of a motor vehicle on such public highway
of this State . . . . ... (emphasis added) ; in re purpose of section, Hart
v. Queen City Coach Co., 241 N.C. 389, 85 S.E. 2d 319 (1955); in re
constitutionality, Davis v. Martini, 233 N.C. 351, 64 S.E. 2d 17 (1951).
'The question of jurisdiction was not res judicata, as no appearance
was made by the insured to contest jurisdiction in the North Carolina
court. For the constitutional basis of this type of process see 32 Mich.
L. Rev. 325 (1934).
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vehicle driven by a sub-permittee, the District Court con-
strued the statute on the strength of three North Carolina
cases. In Pressley v. Turner,4 the Court upheld substituted
service over a nonresident corporation where the driver-
owner was acting as its agent, and stated: "Neither owner-
ship nor physical presence in the motor vehicle is necessary
for valid service. It is sufficient if the nonresident had the
legal right to exercise control at the moment the asserted
cause of action arose."5 The Court also cited Ewing v.
Thompson,' which upheld service over a nonresident
owner of an automobile operated by his son, on the basis
of the family-purpose doctrine of vicarious tort liability.
Countering the latter case's strict holding, Judge Sobeloff
reasoned: "This [family-purpose] doctrine is not determi-
native in interpreting the jurisdictional statute where 'con-
trol or direction' are the standards ... the decision [Ewing
v. Thompson]7 does not stand as authority to limit 'control
or direction' to that precise situation. '8 In Howard v.
Sasso,9 which presented a factual situation similar to the
noted case, the Court's reasoning was the result of plaintiff's
pleadings, which alleged that the driver of the vehicle was
the agent of the defendant owner, acting in the scope of the
latter's employ. In order to sustain service of process, where
the sub-permittee user of the vehicle loaned it to another
in direct violation of specific instructions to the contrary
given by the owner's son, the Court relied on a North Caro-
lina statute" which makes proof of ownership prima facie
evidence that the vehicle was being operated by and under
the control of the person for whose conduct the owner was
legally responsible." In ruling that substituted service of
process was authorized by the motor vehicle statute, the
Circuit Court in the instant case stated: "The statute does
not require that the owner be physically in a position to
'249 N.C. 102, 105 S.E. 2d 289 (1958).
5 Id., pp. 291-292.
6233 N.C. 564, 65 S.E. 2d 17 (1951).
7 Supra, n. 6.
8 294 F. 2d 641, 644 (4th Cir. 1961).
p253 N.C. 185, 116 S.E. 2d 341 (1960).
101C GEN. STAT. of N.C. (1953) Ch. 20, § 20-71.1.
"The Court, nevertheless, emphasized that § 20-71.1 (supra, n. 10) was
a rule of evidence, not a rule of law, applicable whenever a factual
determination as to alleged agency Is to be made. Maryland has no
such statute, although it is a well established Maryland rule of evidence
that proof of ownership of the motor vehicle by defendant raises a
rebuttable presumption that at the time of the accident the operator of
the vehicle was an agent, servant, or employee of the owner, and was
acting within the scope of his employment, on the owner's business or
for his purposes. See 3 M.L.E. § 215 and cases cited. No case has been
found, however, where the Maryland rule has been utilized to sustain
substituted service of process upon a nonresident.
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direct the driver's every move. * * * The words 'express or
implied' suggest only a minimal connection between the
driver and the owner which is satisfied if the owner, as in
this case, has a legal right to control the operation of the
automobile."' 2
In view of the above cases, and although the North
Carolina statute does not expressly so indicate on its face,
it is evident that authorization of substituted service of
process necessarily requires an affirmative finding as to
some form of privity between the nonresident defendant
and the negligent driver. 13 It appears that the holding of
the noted case has not gone beyond the extreme limit of
Howard v. Sasso,'14 where (1) the defendant's evidence
showed a direct violation of the instructions not to lend
the vehicle to the offending driver and (2) the Court in-
voked the aid of a proof of ownership statute to sustain
service of process.
As a guide to a state's satisfaction of procedural due
process in the application of statutory enactments for sub-
jecting a nonresident to a court's jurisdiction, the mile-
stone decision of Pennoyer v. Neff'- established two basic
methods for acquiring in personam jurisdiction: (1) suffi-
cient notice and opportunity for the nonresident to be
heard and (2) personal service within the forum. Mr.
Justice Holmes in McDonald v. Mabee 6 expressed in dic-
tum that physical power is the foundation of a court's
jurisdiction. At present, state legislation has broadened
the in personam jurisdiction requirements for the satisfac-
tion of procedural due process in such areas as automobile, 7
insurance, i" and securities. 9 In the corporate area, concepts
underlying in personam jurisdiction have been re-evaluated
in light of modern needs; and theories such as the "fiction
of implied consent" have yielded to a legal tone sounding
in "activities within the state" as the true basis of juris-
diction 0 as announced in the International Shoe case by
Justice Stone. Recognizing that the basic requirements for
jurisdiction over foreign corporations thereby are reduced
to: (1) statutory provision for adequate notice and (2)
' Supra, n. 1, 645.
Supra, n. 9, 344.
1" Supra, n. 9.
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
17 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) in which the decision is
grounded on police power principles rather than reasonableness of the
process.
" McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
19Henry L. Doherty and Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
2' International Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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sufficient contact with the state to make the assertion of
jurisdictional power reasonable, the Court in the instant
case reasoned that applicability of these requirements to
a private individual was equally justified.2' Utilization of
the familiar "weighing approach" in defining the reason-
ableness of a state's exercise of statutory jurisdiction by
means of its police power necessitates the balancing of such
factors as, (1) the interests of the defendant, including the
expense of going to the forum, (2) the interests of the
plaintiff in adjudicating the case where the cause of action
arose and (3) the necessity that the forum have some inter-
est in opening its courts to the action.2 Adding public
policy grounds to precedent, the Court in the noted case
reasoned: "We merely hold that ownership of property,
particularly that which is capable of inflicting serious in-
jury, may fairly be coupled with an obligation upon the
owner to stand suit where the property is or has been
taken with his consent. Of course, this is so only if the
state chooses by appropriate law to assert its jurisdiction
over him in respect to liability arising out of the use of his
property in that state. '23
The pertinent wording of the North Carolina Non-
Resident Motor Vehicle Statute reads: (in reference to an
action growing out of any accident in which a nonresident
may be involved) "by reason of the operation by him, for
him, or under his control or direction, express or implied.
.. .*24 In comparison, the Maryland statute employs the
terms "while operating or causing to be operated"2 5 in ref-
erence to the conditions upon which substituted service of
process may be made upon a nonresident. Query: Would
the Maryland statute apply to the factual situation of the
noted case? Only one case has been discovered interpreting
the phrase "causing to be operated" as used in the Maryland
statute," but the ruling is clearly based on the master-
servant relationship coupled with the "scope of employ-
See 73 H.L.R. 909 (1960).
2 See noted case, supra, n. 1, 648; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356
(1927); Eckman v. Baker, 224 F. 2d 954, 53 A.L.R. 2d 1167 (1955);
Cf. Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933).
294 F. 2d 641, 648 (4th Cir. 1961) ; See Pizzutti v. Wuchter, 103
N.J.L. 130, 135, 134 A. 727, 729 (1926) ; Cf. Hess v. Pawloski, supra, n. 17
where formal consent is ruled not a requirement to satisfy due process.
2IA GFN. STAT. of N.C. (Supp. 1959) Ch. 1, § 1-105 (emphasis added).
26 MD. CoDE (1957) Art. 66Y2, § 115(a) [authorization of substituted
service of process upon Secretary of State in any action or proceeding]
"growing out of any accident or collision in which said nonresident may
be involved, while operating or causing to be operated, a motor vehicle
on such public highway . . . within . . . Maryland .... " (emphasis
added).
"State of Maryland for use of Kropiunik v. Mast, 144 F. Supp. 946
(D. Md. 1956) which held that a truck owner, who directed his employee
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ment" factor and hardly suggestive of a probable Maryland
ruling on the issue at point. Since the statutes under dis-
cussion call for substituted service of process on nonresi-
dent motorists, they are in derogation of common law and
require strict statutory construction, necessarily eliminat-
ing interpretations not expressly stated or necessarily
implied. 27
In other jurisdictions, the courts have found no difficulty
in applying agency principles where the grounds for such
application are expressly indicated on the face of the stat-
ute. In Fidler v. Victory Lumber Co.,2 arising under the
Florida statute which then authorized service of process
against a non-resident who "by himself, his servant, em-
ployee, or agent ' 29 operates a motor vehicle, service upon
the nonresident auto-owner corporation was quashed where
the latter's president turned the car over to a waitress for
her pleasure and she alone induced a third party to operate
the car for her purpose. The Court, in accordance with the
agency terms of the statute, found no such relation. The
"form of agency" is apparently easily satisfied under the
North Carolina statute. However, the Mississippi Court in
litigation arising under the Mississippi statute employing
the single phrase "while operating a motor vehicle,""° ap-
plied agency principles in upholding substituted service on
a nonresident buyer-owner of two cars being towed through
that state by a driver for the latter's behalf.
With the ever increasing flow of traffic upon the high-
ways and the resulting variety of litigation, the state motor
vehicle statutes, once adequate, became in many cases out-
moded. The United States Court of Appeals, in reversing
the District Court in Eckman v. Baker,"' undoubtedly fur-
nished the impetus for the amendment of the Pennsylvania
Nonresident Motor Vehicle Statute in 1959.2 Construing
to go into Maryland for a load of freight, and the employee entered a
single lease trip for carrying freight out of the state on behalf of the
owner and was involved in a collision in Maryland, caused the vehicle
to be operated under the Maryland statute; 3 M.L.E., Automobiles, § 193;
1 Md. L. Rev. 222, 227 (1937).
" 5 AM. JuR. 830, "AUTOMOBILES", § 591; In accord, Commonwealth for
use of Kern v. Maryland Casualty Co., 112 F. 2d 352 (6th Cir. 1940);
Kerr v. Greenstein, 213 Ark. 447, 212 S.W. 2d 1 (1951).
293 F. Supp. 656 (D. Fla. 1950).
22 FLA. STAT. ANNO. (1943) § 47.29 (emphasis added). A 1949 amend-
ment, however, greatly liberalizing § 47.29 was held not retroactive in this
case.
Tanksley v. Dodge, 181 F. 2d 925 (5th Cir. 1950) arising under GEN_.
L. OF Miss. (1946) Ch. 266, § 61; 7 MIss. CODE (1960 Supp.) § 9352-61.
"I Supra, n. 23.
275-76 PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANNo. (1960) Title 75, Ch. 2, § 2001(a) which
presently states:
"any nonresident of this Commonwealth, being the operator or owner
of any motor vehicle [or being a person in whose behalf a motor
239
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the Pennsylvania statute which limited substituted service
to a nonresident "operator" or "owner" (and in opposition
to prior Pennsylvania lower court reasoning), the Federal
court held that a nonresident defendant whose agent was
driving on the defendant's behalf an automobile owned by
the agent's wife was an "operator" within the meaning of
the statute. In Larsen v. Powell, 3 in which the plaintiff
was injured while riding in a car owned by the nonresident
defendant and driven by the nonresident defendant owner's
son with permission, the Court held that substituted service
was valid against the son, but invalid as against the non-
resident owner as he was not personally operating the car
at the time under the Colorado statute which reads: "in
which such nonresident may be involved while operating
a motor vehicle .... -34 Illinois courts have expressed the
view that nonresident motor vehicle statutes would be in-
applicable if the driver of the offending vehicle was a lender
or bailee without any agency relationship to the owner."
If Maryland should look to New York for guidance in
this area, the related provisions of the New York Vehicle
and Traffic Law 36 use the phraseology, "while using or oper-
ating" and "while being used or operated in this state in
the business of such nonresident or with the permission,
vehicle is being operated whether or not such person is the operator
or owner] who shall accept the privilege . . . of operating a motor
vehicle, or of having the same operated, . . . ."Note: The bracketed
portion arose by amendment in 1959 P.L. 1459 § 1.
33117 F. Supp. 239 (D. Colo. 1953).
" 2 COLO. REV. STAT. ANNO. (Cum. Supp. 1952) Ch. 16, § 48(1) ; 2 COLO.
REV. STAT. ANxo. (1953) Ch. 13, Art. 8, § 2 repealed by L. 1961, Ch. 75,
§ 2; the present statute appears in 2 COLO. REv. STAT. ANNO. (Supp. 1961)
Ch. 13, Art. 8, § 7 and defines a driver as an "owner or operator."
IDalton v. Alexander, 10 Ill. App. 2d 273, 135 N.E. 2d 101 (1956)
arising under ILL. REv. STAT. (1953) Ch. 95Y2, § 23 which stated: "The
use and operation by any person of a motor vehicle... (and an accident
resulting) growing out of such use or resulting in damage or loss to
person and property." Note: Through a change in the Illinois Motor
Vehicle Law, effective January 1, 1958, ILL. REv. STAT. (1953) Ch. 95%,
Art. 111, § 9-301, the statute now reads: "The use and operation by any
person or his duly authorized agent or employee of a motor vehicle .: .
(providing for substituted service) and . . . such process against him
which is so served, shall be of the same legal force and validity as though
served upon him personally .. . or in the event said motor vehicle . . .
is owned by a nonresident and is being operated over and upon the high-
ways of this State with said owner's express or implied permission."(emphasis added). Query: (1) Would not this statute easily encompass
the North Carolina situation? (2) Would not a question be raised as to
the validity of the conclusion reached by Dalton v. Alexander? Cf. The
Maryland statute ends after the above-quoted words "as though served
upon him personally"; the cases are collected in 53 A.L.R. 2d 1164 (1962).
1162A MoKINNEY'S CONSOL. LAWS OF N.Y., A Vehicle & Traffic Law,
Art. 3, § 253 derived from § 52(1) of Vehicle & Traffic Law 1929 as so
amended by Laws 1958, Ch. 568, § 1.
1963] DAVIS v. ST. PAUL-MERC. INDEM. CO. 241
express or implied."37 The latter terms resulted from an
amendment. Prior to this amendment, if an accident oc-
curred through the negligence of a third party who was
operating the car with permission of an absent nonresident
owner, personal service upon the owner was a requisite for
valid in personam jurisdiction.3 8 In Beard v. Clark,39 which
traces the New York struggle with the term "operate", the
Court states: "It would seem that under these amended
statutes in New York and Texas the actual owner of a
motor vehicle, even though not physically operating it
himself, may be properly sued and served there, if it [the
automobile] is being operated by his agents, servants, or
employees, or with his permission express or implied....""
The particular words "causing to be operated" in the
Maryland statute,41 if interpreted liberally so that owner-
ship of the vehicle, which was originally placed in the
hands of a permittee, even though its whereabouts may be
unknown would raise a strong inference that the operation
of such vehicle at the particular time and place of the acci-
dent was a necessary result of such ownership, or implied
ability to control one's property, then perhaps the North
Carolina situation would fit easily into the Maryland stat-
ute.42 Conversely, if causing or causing to be operated
would receive a more direct causal construction, then pos-
sibly the Maryland courts would find difficulty in absorbing
the North Carolina situation. The dictates of legislation
designed to protect residents could be deemed to outweigh
Emphasis supplied. The latter terms resulted from a revision of the
old § 52 of Vehicle & Traffic Law of 1929 to extend application 'of that
section to actions arising out of the use of the vehicle in New York where
the occurrence of the accident is not technically an "operation" of the
vehicle under the narrow construction afforded that term by former
decisions.
See O'Tier v. Sell, 252 N.Y. 400, 169 N.E. 624 (1930); Haughey v.
Mineola Garage, 174 Misc. 332, 20 N.Y.S. 2d 857 (1940); Wallace v.
Smith, 238 App. Div. 599, 265 N.Y.S. 253 (1933) (discussing the New
York struggle). See 7 Syracuse L. Rev. 312 (1955-56) ; Gesell v. Wells,
229 App. Div. 11, 240 N.Y.S. 628, aff'd 254 N.Y. 604, 173 N.E. 885 (1930).
883 S.W. 2d 1023 (1935). Extreme case, reversed on appeal, where
defendant neither owned nor drove the motor vehicle nor was ever in
Oklahoma, yet the lower Oklahoma court acquired jurisdiction Over
defendant by substituted service under C.0.S. (1921) § 10137-1 as amended
by Session Laws (1931) Art. 12, Ch. 50 which strictly required the non-
resident himself to be the operator of the vehicle. The present statute,
OKLA. SrAT. ANNo. tit. 47, § 391 'and § 392, is framed in agency terms.
40 Id., 1025.
6 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 66%, § 115(a).
"Some nonresident motorist statutes are not as explicit as New York's
§ 52 but rather employ terms such as "operator," causing various courts
to interpret "operator" to mean not just the driver but the person on
whose behalf a motor vehicle is driven, even though that person be not
the owner. See Eckman v. Baker, supra, n. 23, 957; ex rel. Maryland has
no family purpose doctrine statute.
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the narrow construction suggested because of the inherent
derogation of the common law by statutes of this nature.
It could be argued that "causing to be operated" is capable
of a more liberal construction than "permission, express or
implied" as expressed by the North Carolina statute, yet
the singular Maryland interpretation connotes "on the
owner's behalf."
Query: Should the Maryland statute envelop the North
Carolina situation, would it be constitutional in appli-
cation? The trend away from the "physical presence" test
of Pennoyer v. Neff43 for valid assertion of in personam
jurisdiction, to the result reached by the North Carolina
court in the noted case, received its impetus from cases
involving the corporate entity. Confronted with the per-
plexing problem as to when a corporation itself could be
subjected to in personam jurisdiction, the courts nurtured
such theories as (1) the implied consent theory, in which
the corporation impliedly consented to service of process
upon a resident agent and (2) the presence test, in which
the entity's presence within the state was assumed because
of its agents' activities there.44 The "doing business" factor
was present in every test developed and remained the chief
guide until the famous International Shoe case declared:
"the test for in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corpo-
ration is not merely ... whether the activity ... is a little
more or a little less. Whether due process is satisfied must
depend . . . upon the quality and nature of the activity in
relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws
which it was the purpose of the due process clause to in-
sure." 5 Here, the employment of such broad terms as
"minimum contacts" - "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice" - and "reasonableness as affected
by the estimate of the inconveniences" overshadowed the
Court's finding that the activities of the corporation were
sufficient to establish its presence even under the former
tests.
In reliance on the "minimum contact" and "inconven-
ience of parties" criteria, the Supreme Court in McGee v.
International Life Insurance Company,46 where in per-
sonam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation was obtained
in an action arising out of a single isolated transaction, held
that it was sufficient for purposes of due process that the
suit was based on a contract which had substantial con-
nection with the forum. This case has been said to illustrate
495 U.S. 714 (1877).
" 44 Oorn. L.Q. 117 (1958) ; 50 N.W. L. Rev. 599 (1955).
"326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
-8355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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the delineation of the outermost constitutional bounds
within which states can acquire in personam jurisdiction,
greatly extending the doctrine of International Shoe.47 Jus-
tice Frankfurter furthered the liberalizing trend in the area
of the private individuals by declaring that the circum-
stances themselves justified in personam jurisdiction in
nonresident motor vehicle cases because of defendant's
presence within the state when the tort was committed,
irrespective of any "fictive consent." 4 However, in Er-
langer Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fiber Mills, Inc.,49 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit questioned
the validity of a state statute authorizing jurisdiction over
a foreign corporation upon a single sale consummated com-
pletely outside the forum, but with reasonable expectation
that the goods were to be used in the forum. Judge Sobeloff
reasoned that the admitted liberalizing tendencies of Inter-
national Shoe were unable to justify jurisdiction on such
minimal contacts.
The significance of the Erlanger Mills reasoning, which,
in effect, redirected the Court's attention to the original
tests for satisfaction of procedural due process as set forth
in the International Shoe opinion is best exemplified when
contrasted with the liberalizing trend in the corporate area
previously referred to, which tended to dilute the strin-
gency of these tests. How does the set-back suffered by
the liberalizing trend in the corporate field affect the area
of the private individual, particularly that of the operator
of a motor vehicle? Professor Cardozo, disagreeing with
the Erlanger Mills case, argues that the inherent danger of
the motor vehicle gives a special significance to the "qual-
ity" and "nature" of the acts, and he poses the question
whether a careless driver from California is more danger-
ous to North Carolina residents than a defective tire sold
by a Californian to be used on North Carolina highways.50
A 1937 Maryland statutory enactment authorizes suits
brought against a foreign corporation for any contract
made "within" the state or for any liability incurred for
acts done "within" the state, whether or not such a foreign
corporation is doing or has done business in Maryland.5 1
4 Supra, n. 45, 120.
48 Olberding v. Illinois Central R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953) noted
14 M.L.R. 62 (1954); However, note that defendant in the instant case
was not present in North Carolina.
"239 F. 2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956), noted 17 Md. L. Rev. 140 (1957).
5 See Cardozo, The Reach Of The Legislature And The Grasp Of
Jurisdiction, 43 Corn. L.Q. 210 (1958). In support of the decision see
Sobeloff, Jurisdiction Of State Courts Over Nonresidents In Our Federal
System, 43 Corn. L.Q. 196 (1958).
' 2 MD. CODE (1951) Art. 23, § 88(d) ; 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 92(d).
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This statute was upheld in Compania De Astral v. Boston
Metals Company52 where a foreign corporation was held
subject to suit in Maryland for alleged breach of a single
contract made in this state.3 It has been suggested that if
the standard of International Shoe has been broadened
beyond the automobile area so as to allow jurisdiction over
corporations engaging in single or sporadic transactions,"
the "business activities" rule sufficient for jurisdiction over
a corporation, should also support jurisdiction over an
individual.55 However, as evidenced by the Maryland stat-
ute, Maryland has not gone this far in the corporate area.
Recent Maryland litigation posed the issue of whether suit
could be maintained against a foreign corporation supplier
of a defective chattel to a resident retailer under the Mary-
land statute making a foreign corporation subject to suit
arising out of a contract made "within" the state. It was
held that the foreign corporation was not amenable to suit,
although the retailer's order originated in Maryland, be-
cause the contract was consummated in New York.56 A
comparison of this decision57 with those in the motor vehi-
cle area clearly illustrates the significance of the policy
reasons of a "higher order" in the latter area dealing with
dangerous machines causing serious peril to persons and
property.
If jurisdictional concepts expand so as to predicate jur-
isdiction upon the doing of any act or transaction within
the state on account of which it would be reasonable for a
state to open its courts, the constitutional extension of in
personam jurisdiction beyond the holding of the noted case
is a foreseeable certainty.
Louis B. PRICE
"205 Md. 237, 107 A. 2d 357 (1954), cert. den. 348 U.S. 943 (1955);
see Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A. 2d 664
(1951) for valid jurisdiction in instance of a single tort.
"For a noteworthy opinion predicting validity of the Maryland statute
as against due process objections, see Reiblich, Jurisdiction of Maryland
Courts Over Foreign Corporations Under The Act of 1937, 3 Md. L. Rev.
35, 71 (1938) which is an exhaustive treatment of the single isolated
transaction problem under the Maryland revision of the corporation laws
concerning assertion of jurisdiction over foreign corporations (Laws of
1937, Ch. 504, § 3).
423 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 804 (1962).
543 Corn. L.Q. 196 (1958) ; 1 BEALE, CoNF ICr OF LAWS, 363-364 (1935).
"Cegielski v. Leon Levi, Inc. & Hunter Metal Industries, Inc., Daily
Record, Feb. 8, 1962 (Md. 1962). The Maryland court relied on Johns v.
Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950) which
held that a foreign corporation was not subject to suit because no negli-
gent act was committed within Maryland and the contract to purchase
Was made outside Maryland.
11 The decision is certainly reconcilable due to the non-compliance with
the Maryland statute.
